Updated October 3, 2026.
This page brings together the proposals of the Movimiento Republicano for Venezuela's transition and for the government of the Sixth Republic. Each proposal derives from the three pillars and the six commitments of Prosperity Engineering set out on the Ethics & Foundations page. Use the index to go directly to the chapter that interests you.
Before proposing concrete paths, the Movimiento Republicano sets out the principles it is not willing to sacrifice in any negotiation, however urgent or complex the circumstances may be. These principles derive directly from the three pillars (see Ethics & Foundations) and from the six commitments of Prosperity Engineering, applied specifically to the moment of transition.
Constitutional legality above all. No transition solution may be built outside the 1999 Constitution, not even by invoking the urgency of the earthquake emergency or the complexity of the power vacuum. An unconstitutional shortcut today is the precedent that another authoritarian project will use tomorrow.
Free elections, with international observation and participation of the diaspora. Any electoral calendar that is negotiated must meet verifiable minimum conditions; it cannot be a mere announcement of a date.
Neither impunity nor revenge. Transitional justice must rigorously distinguish between political dissent and responsibility for serious crimes or corruption, and avoid both wiping the slate clean and indiscriminate persecution.
Protection of life and continuity of essential services. No power struggle may hold hostage the reconstruction following the June 2026 earthquakes, medical care, the electricity supply or public safety.
National sovereignty as a horizon, not as an excuse. Current international cooperation must have clear exit conditions leading to full democratic sovereignty, and must not become a long-term structural dependency.
Full transparency of public spending during the transition. Oil revenues, reconstruction funds and international cooperation funds must be subject to independent audit, precisely because the National Assembly does not currently exercise effective budgetary oversight.
These principles act as a filter: every concrete proposal must be explainable without violating any of them. Where that is not possible, the Movimiento Republicano prefers a slower but clean transition to a fast one that reproduces the vices we already know.
The Movimiento Republicano proposes an institutional path intended to support the working dialogue between the Government and the National Assembly elected in 2015, with a realistic approach focused on facilitating the organization of elections within a reasonable timeframe. As a political organization, we understand that any proposal must take into account the urgency created by the earthquakes and, at the same time, consider the transition backed by the United States Department of State: these processes are not mutually exclusive and must move forward in a responsible and coordinated manner. We therefore propose:
A shared-guarantees mechanism. Since the strict letter of the Constitution did not anticipate a scenario like the present one, we propose that the interim government be accompanied by a shared-guarantees mechanism among the political sectors, including the National Assembly elected in 2015, and overseen by international observers, to ensure that the path to elections has the endorsement of all political and social sectors.
Collaboration with the electoral technical commission. The Movimiento Republicano places itself at the disposal of the commission led by Deputy Dinorah Figuera to collaborate, assist and advise in the inquiry that will culminate in a report, expected in December 2026, on the situation of the National Electoral Council (CNE), electoral regulations and the reforms needed to organize future elections.
An electoral calendar without verifiable minimum conditions is just a date in a press release. The Movimiento Republicano proposes the following conditions as non-negotiable for any presidential election to be recognized as legitimate, both at home and abroad:
A National Electoral Council (CNE) with a pluralistic membership that is verifiably independent of the Executive Branch.
An updated voter registry, with real registration and voting mechanisms for the more than 7.7 million Venezuelans living abroad.
International election observation with full access, including bodies such as the European Union, the Organization of American States (OAS/OEA) and independent technical missions.
Security conditions and equitable media access for all candidates, with explicit guarantees for the return to the country of leaders such as María Corina Machado.
A technical audit of the voting and results-transmission system, with the capacity for independent citizen verification.
Electoral logistics must be planned for any type of election that may be called: presidential, regional, local or legislative. But it must also solve a new practical problem: a large part of the voting infrastructure in La Guaira state and in parts of Caracas and Miranda was damaged by the June earthquakes. For this reason, any electoral calendar must include, starting now, a plan for alternative polling stations for communities displaced by the earthquake. Only in this way can the country's physical reconstruction and institutional strengthening advance in a parallel and balanced manner.
Since the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the interim government has promoted an Amnesty Law that allowed the release of several hundred political prisoners, documented for years by organizations such as Foro Penal. The Movimiento Republicano recognizes this as a positive step, but maintains that transitional justice cannot be limited to a general amnesty, since it requires a clear distinction between the different categories of responsibility.
This approach draws on the experience of truth and reconciliation commissions in other countries of the region, adapted to the Venezuelan case: processes that have shown that a sustainable transition needs both truth and clear limits on impunity, while avoiding the cycle of retaliation that has marked much of Venezuela's political history over the last century. The goal is not to settle scores, but to heal wounds in a way that they do not reopen with the next change of government.
There is a point the Movimiento Republicano considers critical and that is usually absent from public debate: restitution of, or compensation for, expropriated and confiscated property must be integrated into this transitional justice process, and not treated as a merely civil matter that can be postponed. Private property is, as set out in Ethics & Foundations, one of the three essential pillars of the Movement, and its systematic violation over two decades deserves a reparation mechanism as serious as the one provided for violations of civil and political rights.
The transition must simultaneously confront two economic emergencies: the structural fragility of the economy and the specific cost of reconstruction following the June 2026 earthquakes. The Movimiento Republicano proposes an emergency stabilization package organized along four fronts.
The partial easing of sanctions on the oil sector, which has underpinned much of the recent economic rebound, should be maintained and expanded, but explicitly conditioned on verifiable progress along the institutional path. This gives the international community a clear incentive to support the transition and, at the same time, prevents sanctions relief from becoming a blank check to prolong a government without electoral legitimacy.
Reconstruction resources, including the multi-donor fund of the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) and any additional assistance, must be managed through an independent, publicly accessible audit mechanism. The Movimiento Republicano proposes creating a technical oversight body, with the participation of civil society organizations specializing in transparency, as a condition for the disbursement of both domestic and international funds.
More than twelve thousand seven hundred families were affected by the June 2026 earthquakes. Emergency economic stabilization must include direct, temporary assistance to these families (transitional housing, access to health care and to food), designed to prevent the loss of homes and jobs from pushing more Venezuelans into the migration flows.
Every stabilization measure must resist the temptation to replace price controls with other price controls, or exchange controls with other exchange controls under a different name. The emergency response requires clear fiscal rules, transparency in the use of oil revenue and a gradual strengthening of the autonomy of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). This is not about seeking shortcuts that promise immediate relief, but about not repeating the mistakes the country has already lived through and that did so much damage to the economy and the financial system.
Washington maintains close operational cooperation with the interim government, but without firmly demanding compliance with the constitutional calendar. In response, the Movimiento Republicano proposes a transition foreign policy built on three strategic lines:
The Movimiento Republicano recognizes the practical value of the security, humanitarian and energy cooperation that the United States has offered since January 2026, and also recognizes the scale of the international response to the earthquake, which mobilized more than thirty countries. But that cooperation must not be read as an endorsement of the continuation of Delcy Rodríguez's government. The Movimiento Republicano therefore calls on its international counterparts, starting with Washington, to explicitly and publicly condition the level of cooperation on verifiable progress along the electoral path and the governmental transition.
The response to the earthquake showed that Venezuela can mobilize broad and diverse international support, from Latin America to Europe and Asia, when the cause is humanitarian rather than political. The Movimiento Republicano proposes activating that same range of relationships for the institutional agenda: support from the European Union and multilateral organizations for election observation; financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB/BID), the World Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) conditioned on transparency and reform milestones; and a Venezuelan transition diplomacy that does not depend on a single power to sustain the process.
Current international cooperation, including Washington's influence over much of the humanitarian and security coordination, must be understood as a transitional stage, not as the new normal of Venezuelan foreign policy. The Movimiento Republicano commits to preparing the technical and diplomatic teams that will allow an elected government to assume full and sovereign control of the country's foreign policy. This includes renegotiating the foreign debt and reintegrating Venezuela into international financial institutions on dignified and fair terms.
What an ordinary Venezuelan can do today:
Take part in citizen oversight of the use of reconstruction funds following the June 2026 earthquakes, demanding public and verifiable information on every resource invested.
Update their voter registration and, for those living abroad, verify and demand real mechanisms for voting from the diaspora.
Organize community civil-protection and emergency-response capabilities in their neighborhood or residential area, since the June earthquake exposed the limitations of the State apparatus in this field. This does not replace the State's responsibility, but it can save lives while that capacity is rebuilt.
Actively reject any call to violence or indiscriminate revenge, and demand instead that transitional justice follow the institutional channels described in Chapter 4.
The Movimiento Republicano does not propose that citizens replace the State or political parties in leading the transition. It proposes something different: that no Venezuelan treat the transition as someone else's business that others will resolve on their behalf. The Venezuelan experience shows what happens when citizens entirely delegate oversight of power to those who wield it or to the opposition.
The smart State can no longer remain a mere doctrinal statement: it must be translated into concrete institutional design. It must be present where citizens need it (security, justice, education, health, infrastructure and institutional protection) and know how to step back where bureaucracy holds back private and social initiative. The separation of powers is not guaranteed by good intentions or speeches: it is protected by design rules that make its capture costly, difficult and detectable. Only in this way can a State that is both present and restrained be effective and trustworthy at the same time.
We propose a system for selecting the justices of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) through a public competition based on credentials, with binding participation of civil society and professional associations in the nomination process, fixed and non-renewable terms, and a transparent disciplinary regime that prevents both the political persecution of judges and their manipulation by whoever holds power.
The institutional design proposed for calling elections and ensuring an effective process requires shielding the electoral authority through staggered appointments, autonomous funding guaranteed by law and permanent technical audits of its systems. With these mechanisms, the independence of the National Electoral Council (CNE) would not depend on the political balance of power of the moment, but on a stable and professional institutional structure.
For years, Venezuela's public administration has faced challenges that limited its ability to function as a technical body fully oriented toward serving citizens. To strengthen it, we propose a Civil Service Career Law that establishes entry through competitive examination, job security based on professional criteria and performance evaluation. Its progressive implementation would make it possible to rebuild the State's institutional capacity and consolidate a more efficient, merit-based public administration oriented toward the general interest.
Every newly created or reformed public body must incorporate, from its original design, an open data portal in reusable formats, updated quarterly, containing its budget broken down by line item and final beneficiary, all of its contracts from tender to payment, and the performance indicators of its management. Failure to comply with this obligation will bar the transfer of public funds to the body and will give rise to administrative liability for its heads.
Judicial reform cannot be limited to the highest court. We propose extending public competitions and the judicial career to all levels of the judiciary, strengthening the Judicial School as an institution for technical training, and promoting an autonomous budget for the Judicial Branch that allows it to operate with stability, within the framework of respect for the powers that belong to each branch of government.
We propose a public safety strategy centered on community policing, professionalized criminal intelligence and a clear delineation of responsibilities between police and military forces, reserving the use of the latter for situations that justify it. We also propose strengthening civilian security institutions and progressively moving toward the regularization and supervision of all actors involved in territorial control, in accordance with the current legal framework and with full respect for constitutional guarantees.
Venezuela's prison system requires a far-reaching reform that clearly distinguishes deprivation of liberty for serious ordinary crimes from other uses of the criminal justice system, with technical criteria and uniform procedures. That reform must incorporate restorative justice mechanisms for minor offenses and reduce overcrowding through investment in infrastructure and alternatives to prolonged pretrial detention.
This chapter translates the pillar of private property and the Prosperity Engineering approach into concrete economic policy, based on the diagnosis of the collapse and the still-fragile recovery of the Venezuelan financial system.
We propose a reform that grants real autonomy to the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), with a legal prohibition on monetary financing of the fiscal deficit, and a transparent exchange-rate regime that recognizes the role that de facto dollarization already plays in the Venezuelan economy, instead of fighting it with controls that experience has shown to be ineffective.
We propose modernizing the real estate and commercial property registry to make it more efficient and legally secure, as well as addressing pending expropriation cases through the mechanisms provided for in the current legal system. We also support strengthening procedural guarantees that ensure due process and fair compensation in every expropriation, in accordance with the Constitution and the international treaties signed by Venezuela. All of this is aimed at building a climate of confidence that protects private property and encourages domestic and foreign investment for the benefit of the country's economic development.
We propose a radical simplification of the procedures for starting and operating businesses, a reduction of the room for administrative discretion that for years created additional costs and uncertainty for investors, and a trade policy that reintegrates Venezuela into the regional trade agreements from which it distanced itself over the last two decades.
We propose replacing the complex system of taxes and parafiscal levies of the last twenty years with a simplified national tax regime, based on stable rules that give businesses and households the certainty they need to plan, an essential condition for attracting long-term investment.
Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world and, even so, went through a process of severe economic decline over recent decades. This chapter seeks to overcome that paradox once and for all, strengthening the country's capacity to transform its energy resources into sustainable growth and well-being.
We propose the full professionalization of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), separating operational management from direct political interference, with a technical board of directors subject to public accountability and independent external audits. The opening to private participation in the operation of fields and refineries, a process already under way, must be consolidated through a stable legal framework rather than depending on discretionary administrative decisions.
Near-exclusive dependence on oil revenue was itself one of the causes of Venezuela's economic vulnerability. We propose developing the country's natural gas potential, exploring renewable energy (solar and hydroelectric) by taking advantage of the national geography, and a gradual strategy to reduce fiscal dependence on oil.
The Orinoco Mining Arc requires comprehensive regularization, both legal and environmental, that eradicates informal and unsupervised exploitation and ensures that all mining activity is carried out under verifiable environmental standards, with the participation and oversight of the Indigenous and local communities involved.
The fifth commitment of Prosperity Engineering (see Ethics & Foundations) establishes that Venezuela cannot develop from Caracas alone. This chapter turns that commitment into concrete policy.
We propose a new system of intergovernmental transfers based on objective and verifiable formulas (population, poverty, infrastructure needs) instead of the discretionary management of the constitutional revenue allocation (situado constitucional) seen over the last two decades, together with the obligation for every state government and every mayor's office to openly publish how those resources are spent.
Decentralization without local management capacity ends up being decentralization on paper only. We propose technical training programs for municipal and state officials, with the support of regional universities, so that territorial autonomy is accompanied by the technical competence needed to exercise it.
The reconstruction of La Guaira state following the June 2026 earthquakes offers a concrete opportunity to apply a plan designed and carried out with the real participation of local authorities and communities, rather than imposed centrally from Caracas. It can become the first visible success story of the decentralization model that the Movimiento Republicano proposes for the entire country.
This chapter institutionalizes, over the medium term, citizen oversight, monitoring of the various areas of the State and the vigilance over power that citizens must exercise during the transition. Civic participation in public affairs must not depend on the passing goodwill of a government: it must be built into the permanent design of the State.
We propose giving permanent legal backing to citizen social oversight bodies (contralorías sociales), with guaranteed access to information on public contracts, budget execution and infrastructure works at every level of government.
We propose that a set portion of the municipal investment budget be allocated through participatory budgeting mechanisms, in which organized communities decide directly on local investment priorities.
The oversight body proposed in section 5.2 for post-earthquake reconstruction funds should become a permanent institution, applicable to any public fund of significant size, with technical training so that organized citizens can exercise that function effectively and not merely symbolically.
Education deserves a chapter of its own, rather than scattered treatment, because it faces both an emergency in coverage and quality and a historic task of civic education that no other sector can take on in its place.
The most recent edition of the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) recorded total school enrollment of just 64%, still below the 70% observed before the pandemic, and found that 44% of the school-age population attends classes irregularly. These figures reflect both the deterioration of school infrastructure and the mass exodus of teachers from the education system, drawn to other occupations by salaries that for years were not enough to cover the basic basket of goods. Based on this diagnosis, three urgent lines of action are identified:
An emergency school infrastructure plan that prioritizes schools damaged by the June 2026 earthquakes and those used as temporary shelters during the emergency.
Higher teacher salaries as a condition for reversing the exodus of teachers, financed through clear fiscal rules and not through money printing.
Learning recovery programs for the generation of students who faced institutional collapse, the pandemic and the migration of their teachers all at once.
We propose incorporating into the national curriculum content on recent economic and institutional history, based on verifiable sources (the International Monetary Fund (IMF/FMI), the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) and the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI)), taught with rigor and without indoctrination.
The goal is not to produce citizens loyal to an ideology, but citizens capable of recognizing, on the basis of evidence, when a public policy repeats mistaken patterns, regardless of the name or banner of whoever proposes it in the future. This education must include instruction on the mechanisms of civic participation and institutional oversight, so that the next generation of Venezuelans learns in school how to keep watch over power.
We propose strengthening technical and vocational education in direct coordination with the productive sectors, through mandatory internship programs, skills certification recognized by business associations, and partnerships between regional universities and the local productive base, so that this pathway ceases to be the residual option of the Venezuelan education system and becomes a real path to social mobility.